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BlackBerry-maker RIM is struggling following some terrible recent results. It’s now under pressure to hasten the launch of next generation BlackBerry smartphones.

RIM must resist and instead execute better.

The most shocking part of those results was the performance of the PlayBook tablet. Just 200,000 shipped in its second quarter on sale, under half the 500,000 in its first quarter.  This has scared observers as the PlayBook is RIM’s first next generation product of many in a major product transition that will transform RIM’s entire range. The PlayBook is built on the same QNX OS foundation that will power future BlackBerry smartphones.

The PlayBook’s failure clearly demonstrates why speed of delivery, at the expense of quality execution, is the wrong strategy for RIM now despite the pressure:

• The Playbook attempted to go head to head with the iPad by focusing on a media-centric experience, with Flash support, video output to a TV set and elegant multitasking. This diversification spread RIM’s R&D efforts too thin for a company attempting to do three major things: defend its core markets; evolve its old product range; as well as building a completely new set of products using QNX OS.
• RIM failed to appeal to its existing communication-centric customers. For corporates, the PlayBook lacked integration with BES and any native email capability. For young consumers, typically Curve owners, the PlayBook lacked BlackBerry Messenger.

The drop in RIM’s overall device shipments isn’t surprising and shouldn’t lead to a change in strategy. While quarterly device shipments were 10.6 million, down 1.5 million from the equivalent quarter in 2010, they were 2.3 million higher than the same quarter in 2009. RIM remains profitable. In the circumstances, given the complete product portfolio-wide transition that RIM’s largest customers — operators and enterprises — know is about to happen this is a pretty good holding action.

RIM is about to start a major product transition from smartphones based on an evolution of the original BlackBerry software to the new QNX phone operating system that also powers the PlayBook tablet. These kinds of product transitions are hard to do, are always risky, and always threaten to undercut sales of old generation products. Analogous product switches show how hard it is to do:

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This post was originally published on my Forrester blog.

At MWC, multiple companies have launched mobile application stores that seek to build upon Apple's iPhone success (Microsoft, Nokia, Orange, mPortico, Surfkitchen, Adtonic, PocketGear and others). These join existing announced app stores (including RIM, Google Android, Palm).

These are more than simple me-too initiatives.

Mobile app stores are not new. Palm, Handango and even Nokia with their Download! service pre-date Apple. Like the iPod, Apple was a follower — rather than first mover — that succeeded due to terrific execution and a clear strategy and market position. Apple benefits from the ease of commercial iPhone application distribution. Developers now prosper in a virtuous circle:

• iPhone application store is easy to use on phone or PC. It offers consumers reviews, user ratings, reliable download & install and low price points. Developers benefit from reliable content protection.
• Developers sell more applications and so prioritise more r&d for iPhone over other phones. This leads to a greater catalogue of applications.
• The greater wealth of third party support increases the benefit for consumers of owning an iPhone, thus driving iPhone sales.
• A greater installed base of iPhones increases the audience of potential application buyers, leading to increased application sales.

To succeed, owners much ensure that their store's convenience to consumers is high. Superb execution will be critical.